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.tfr URING the last decade, nianv countnes have
experienced relatively high rates of inflation. tni me-
sponse to this persisting phenomemion, people have
changed their payment habits, restructured their
portfolios and increasingly resorted to different forms
of indexation.’ Since inflationary episodes have dif-
fered across countries, it is not surprising to find
variations in the degree and nature of inflationary
adjustment across countm’ies.
The Ism-aeli expen’ience with inflationary adjustment
is ofparticular intem-est because Israelhas experienced
relatively long, high and variable inflation and, in
response, has developed an elaborate system of in-
flationary adjustment. Ist-ael expermeniced two pem-iods
of high inflation during Wom’ld War’ It and dum-ing the
first years of its independence: the annual rate of
inflationi averaged about 27 percent between 1939 arid
1943 and about 34 percent between 1951) and 1953.
Between 1954 and the end of the I960s, the rate of
inflationwas reduced to arelatively mild 5 percent per
year. tnt the 1970s, however, initiation accelerated map—
idly see table ‘ii it averaged about 40 percent per yean’
between 1973 and 1978, 125 peicenil hetweeti 1979 and
September 1983, and over 400 pen-cent during 1984.’ fri
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July 1985, the tsraehi government embarked on a
stabilization program, which has reduced inflation to
an annual n-ate of 27 percent between July 1985 and
May 1986.
The Israeli public and its goven-nment have re-
sponded to this inflationary experience in a variety of
ways F
ii ‘the initroductioni arid applicarioni ofinidexatnon to
a wide ~•‘an-ietv of econoniic transactions. Wage
indexation was introduced dur-ing Wor-ld War II.
IJuring the 195os, thegovernment indexed both its
long—term debt and long—term loans to the public:
indexation of tifc insurance ~%‘as also introduced,
In 1975, indexation was applied to tax brackets arid
tax exemptions. to addition, imndexafion is niow
applied to other transactions, including construe—
tion and rcntal contr-acts, some shon-t—tcrni loans,
and pn-opertv insurance,
2 Variations in the use of indexation, Ttius, tor exam—
pIe indexation of long—ten-nit loans from the govern—
merit to the public was pn-actically abandoned in
the 1 960s and gradually n’eintroduc:ed in the 1970s.
3i Var-iations in the fn-equencv of pm-icr and othcr ad—
ustmeots. ‘l’bus, ion’ example, the f’n’equeocv of
paynien r of the cost of Living Allowance on wages
increased from even’six months inthe mid—i 970s to
even’month by the end of 1984.
41 \‘an-iations in the ‘‘nate of indexation ,-. i.e.. in the
exlent to which indexed prices were adjusted.
‘t’hius, the inme of intlexahon for’ ‘~‘age sine reused
fn-om 70 percent in the nilid — 1970s to 80—9(1 pen’cr’, On
in the IRSOs at the sante tinne therate ofinidexanion
of tax brackets inrn’eased mont 7(1 percent no tot)
p ~rr:t.nnt
‘The lsraeli government has played a relativelylarge role in Israel’s
ad)ustment fo inflation. For additional discussion of the adjustment
of the israeli economytoinflation, and, in particular, oftheproblems
ofindexation. see Brenner and Patinkin (1977). Cukierman (1985).
Fischer (1985), Kieiman (1977. July 1984). Oded Liviatan (1982.
1985). Shiffer(1984) and Sokoler(1985).f4hsfif:fVS SAfif( C’S ST. flITS 195’S
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5) Tax reforms aimed at imposing corporate income
taxes on inflation-adjusted profits.
6) Intensive financial innovation and important
changes in the structure offinancial portfolios.
71 Changes in themix ofeconomic activity such as the
allocation ofmore economic resources to financial
and tax management.
The purpose of this article is to discuss some
problems that Israel has faced under conditions of
high and rising inflation, how it has tried to adjust to
them, and some shortcomings of the solutions
adopted with special reference to the last decade - The
firstsection discusses, in general terms, the effects u~
inflation on price adjustment and the use of index-
ationi. The next section deals with wage indexation in
israel and discusses the effects of the adoption of
partial indexation. The third section investigates the
effects of inflation on taxation and the partial adjust-
ment of the tax system to inflation in Israel. In the
fourth section, we analyze how financial and asset
markets have reacted to inflation tinder conditions of
imperfect adjustment in thetax system and in govern-
ment financial transactions.
IL”,. ffT%’T’T’I,ffl:I4,1~~9, (9%. i’~:. ‘~ 5: f:.::..
justed to changes in demand and supply; rather, they
are maintained for a certain period of time before
being adjusted by sellers, buyers, negotiators or regu-
lators. Price-setters decide how often to change prices
by comparing two kinds ofcosts associated with such
changes: (a) the cost of changing the price, including
possible reactions of customers, competitor’s and the
general public (or the authorities)’, and (b) the loss
associated with not adjusting the existing price in
view of changing market conditions, The price will be
changed when the latter outweighs the former.
Any price that remains unchanged during an in-
flationary period decreases relative to the prices that
are rising. Consequently, price-setters typically will
find that unchanged prices will deviate more rapidly
and by larger amounts from their (changingl optimal
prices, the higher the rate of inflation. They will also
find that their customers will increase theirpurchases
when prices are relatively low, forcing larger fluctua-
tions in the price-setter’s production or inventories.5
Hence, it is not surprising that, as inflation has accel-
erated, Israeli producers have adjusted their prices
more frequentlyY The Israeli government has also
adjusted more frequently its managed rate of foreign
exchange, the prices of its services and the prices of
private goods that it regulates.
The administrative cost of price adjustment can be
reduced ifthe price is adjusted routinely according to
some relativelysimple rule. The choice of a particular
price adjustment rule depends on operating costs of
~Customers generally find frequent price adjustments inconvenient;
moreover, price-setters may be uncertain about the reactions of
their competitors as well. In addition, public opinion sometimes
condemnsprice increasesbecausethepublic believes that theyare
“unfair” orbecause they believe inthe cost-pushview of inflation. In
Israel, the public especially opposed increases in the prices of
government-controlled fooditems.
iln one famous episode, the Israeli public began hoarding public
telephone tokens when it recognized that the adjustment oftoken
prices was long overdue. The government, which owns the tele-
phone company, “refused togive a prize to speculators”; instead of
raising the price of the tokens, it producedmore tokens. Of course,
these immediately disappeared from the market as well. Thus, the
government incurred unnecessary production costs for the “extra”
tokens and kept the prices of its service too low for too long.
Meanwhile,the general public chosetohoard thetokens ratherthan
to use the public telephone system. When the government finally
raised the priceofthetokens, theyreappeared in the market,
°For rigorous discussionsofthe conditions under which this reaction
will prevail, see Galyam and Hanoch (1984) and Sheshinski and
Weiss (1977, 1983). Galyam and Hanoch (1984) report that the
averagefrequency of private price adjustments in Israel increased
from 3.3 times peryear in 1973 to 5.1 times per year in 1979, In most markets, ptit:es are not continuously ad—FEDERAL 9S E GAS’S OF ST. LOtiIS
alternative rules, and on the extent to which they
approximate the path of pnce changes that would
be chosen iftherewere no adjustment costs. In certain
cases, the price-setter’ may even decide to announce
his price adjustment rule to provide potential cus-
tomers with useful information,
One simple rule would be to increase pr’ices over
time at some predetermined rate. Thus, for example,
between mid-1975 and September 1977, the Israeli
government devalued tile exchange i-ate at an almost
constant rate of 2 percent per month.
As an alternative, price adjustment can be based on
indeyation; prices can be increased by a percentage
that is equal — or at least i-elated — to the rate of
change of a specific standard (for example, a price
index). Thus, construction contractor’s in Israel often
index their prices to the “cost of construction index.”
ln recent years, many firms and traders have started
quoting their pr-ices in terms of tJ.S. dollars. This
amounts to a daily adjustment of the Shekel (Israeli
currency) price in terms of changes in the i-ate of
exchange between Shekels and U.S. dollars. Between
1979 and 1982, the government gener-allv carried out a
policy of ‘‘indexation’’ of therate ofexchange. Accor’d—
ing to this policy, the tsraelicurrency was devalued at
the r’ate that was rottghly equal to the differ-ence
between the domestic and for-eign r’ates of inflation,
thus, trying to stabilize the relative price of tradeable
\‘s. othergoods.
~l’i~1 Ifs-a a! tnde.~a titan In. (li’ed’Ii.
Transactions aiwl .t”n.tnre ]ntr-arts~’
The most important use of indexation itl Israel has
been in cr-edit transactions and other future contracts
— situations that involve contractual obligations for
future payments. Parties to such contracts ar-c gener’—
ally concer’ned with the i-cal value of payments (i.e.,
the pr-ice deflated value), and not with their nominal
value. If they expect the general p11cc level to change,
they can adjust the nominal value of the stipulated
future paymei~tsto achieve their desired future cx—
pected i-cal level. ‘l’hus, in the case ofa Imin, the parties
can add an ‘‘expected milalionary premium’’ to the
rate of interest. Ifthe rate of inflation deviates from its
expected level, however, the r-eal value of the futtire
pavmen ts will 1w differ-ent from that assumed x~’hen
the conti-art was made.
‘For referencesto the large body of literature dealing with problems
of indexation, see, for example, Dornbusch and Simonsen (1983)
and Fischer (1983)and McNelis (1985).
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As an alternative, parties to a contract can index
friture payments using some mutually agreeable
method. In this case there is no uncertainty about the
real value of thture payments (measured in terms of
the standard used for indexation); the nominal pay-
ments, however-, will be unknown in advance.
The choice between these two systems of adjust-
ment depends on several considerations:
(II The confidence that the public has in its expecta-
tions about the behavior of prices during the con-
tract period. This confidence depends on the ex-
pected variation in the rate ofinflation and on the
length of the contract period.
(21 ‘I’he extent towhich the value ofthe parties’ por-tfo—
lbs and their flows of income and consumption
react to changes in pr-ices. ‘thus, for example, if a
boi-r-ower expects that the nominal value of his
income and assets will not be affected by variation
in the i-ate of inflation during the loan period, he
will be reluctant to index his loan,’
(3) The per’ceived cost of introducing and operating
indexation. This cost depends on the degree to
which indexation ar’r’angements have been used in
the economy in the past.
(:.flti.CiS.fns nf .Inhklsat,00 Itt n,n
Inflatlonan Environment
‘l’he use ofindexation is son etimes criticized on the
gt’ounds that it maynot pr’oduce the same r’esults that
would occur under frequent, low—costreadjustments.
‘l’his criticism applies, in principle, to all pr-c-
deter’mined formulas for pr-ice adjustment, and
should be weighed agairlst the benefits of contr’actual
relationships. Indexation, however, is dilier-ent fr-nm
other’ pri~adjustment formulas, because it may pro-
duce relative price r’igiclities that cannot be overcome
by higher rates of inflation (unless indexation is in—
compIetel. ‘Ibis problem is especially acute when the
econom is subject to strong, non—r’evei-sible shocks
like the energy price shocks in the 1970s. By retarding
the adjustment of relative prices, indexation may
compound the real effects of such shocks.”
It has sometimes also been argued that indexation
intr’oduces an inflationary bias into the economy. By
exacen-batingthe process ofthe econonw’s adjustment
to a non—reversible exogenous shock, for example,
‘Since, by assumption, his assets and incomes are not indexed, he
will obviously lose wealth from unexpected inflation; however, his
loss would be greater if his obligations were indexed. See Levhari
and Liviatan (1977).
‘See Gray (1976).
22’indexation may mci-ease unemployment and create
pressures for more expansionarY policies. Moreover’,
because indexation tr’ansmits pr-ice changes rapidly
throughout the economy, thereby augmenting the
short-run effects of temporary disturbances on the
general price Iex.’eI, it may create pressur-es for’accom—
modatmng policies. l”inally, to the extent that it reduces
the per’ceived costs of inflation, indexation may
weaken the public’s opposition to inflation.
On Ihe other-hand, it might be argued that, if the tax
system and gover’nment debt ar-c indexed, the govern-
merit will have less incentive to cr’eate inflation. Also,
the cost of anti—inflationary policies could be lower’
when contr’acts ar-c indexed, since unexpected disin-
flation will not cause tinexpected increases in the real
value ofwages and interest payments.”
While it might seem convenient to use a single
standard of indexation for’ all pur’poses, such a uni-
form index will not be optimal for all tr’ansactions if
different prices r’ise at different rates. In such cases,
multiple indexation standards may he preferable,’ this
has occurred in Israel. The Isr’aeli government im-
poses indexation to the consumer price indey )CPI) in
most of its own transactions and in contr’acts that it
regulates. The private sector also uses the CPI to index
some of its tr’ansactions. Indexation to specific indus-
Fryprice indeyes, however’, is also used, especially in
construction contracts.” Occasionally, people will use
some ad hoe index that r’eflects conditions associ-
ated with a specific contr’act mor-e closely than do the
generally published price indexes. Finally, indexation
to the rate of exchange of aJhreign currency (chiefly
the U.S. dollar-) has become mor’e popular in r’ecent
years. It is especially common in short-ter’m financial
transactions and in transactions between private non-
financial parties. Firms engaged in foreign trade also
index their transactions to the i-ate of exchange.
Considerations gover’ning the choice of the stand-
ard ofindexation depend on the nature ofthe transac-
tion involved and, in principle, at-c similar’ to those
“This effect is stronger, the higher is the rate of indexation and the
trequency of its application. See Fischer (1983) and Friedman
(1974).
“Thegovernment hadrejected proposalsto indexits loans to specific
industryindexes. Proponentsof this type ofindexation argued that it
would both reduce the industries’ risks and suppress price in-
creases, because price-setters who raised prices would be penal-
ized by higherdebtrepayment. Theobviousdrawback ofthis type of
indexation is that ((creates incentivesfor inefficient resource use.
affecting the choice between indexation and nominal
price adjustment formulas discussed above. Since
different indexes may increase atdifferent r’ates(espe-
ciallv in the short run), the choice of the indexation
standar’d afflicts the allocation of risk between the
parties to a contract.”
In Israel, the extent of the use of different standards
of indexation has varied over time in reaction to
changes in the mix of economic activity and the
experience with the performance of different indexes.
Thus, for example, the use of the U.S. dollar as a
standard of indexation declined substantially follow-
ing a large devaluation in the early 1960s; it has
r’egained popularity with the tr-ansition to frequent
devaluations since the rnid-1970s. In r’ecent year’s, this
indexation has spread r’apidly for’ two reasons. First, it
allows frequent adjustments since the i-ate of ex-
change is changed and published daily; price indexes,
on the other’ hand) are calculated monthly and pub-
lished with a two-week delay. At higher’ rates of in-
flation the value of frequent pt-ice adjustments out-
weighs the disadvantage of using an index that may
not refiect exactly the costs and r’eventles of the
contracting parties. Second, the use of foreign ex-
change as a standard of deferred payments was also
enhanced by its increased use as a means of exchange
and a temporary abode of purchasing power see
below).
/
Wage indexation was introduced to (si-ac) during
World War 11. It is based on a Cost of Living Allowance
COLA) agreement negotiated between the labor un-
ions association and the mnajor private employers
association. The provisions of the COLA agreement at-c
extended, by government decree, to worker’s and em-
ployer’s that are not represented at COLA negotiations.
‘rhe provisions of the COLA have varied consider-
ably over- time. Their’ present structur’e is based on
r’ecommendations of a committee established in 1975
by the government, the labor union association and
the employer’s federation. This committee recom-
mended that the COLA he adjusted at six-month
intervals by70 per’cent of past CPI increases, pr-ovnded
that the CP) has increased by at least 5 percent during
“Generallyspeaking, the indexation standard is one ofthe negotiable
provisions ofacontract. The choiceofthestandard depends both on
the perceived risks involvedand on theexpected ratesofincrease of
different indexes,the relevant period.” The committee decided against
100 percent indexation on the grounds that the COLA
should not compensate wage-ear’ners for changes in
indirect taxation and in foreign prices — two distur-
bances that wer-e supposedly associated with 30
percent of the price increases prior to 1975.”
As the rate of inflation acceler’ated, the minimum
intervalbetween payments was reduced, fir-st to three
months and, by 1984, to one month. The rate of
indexation was also increased; the COLA by 1984
provided 80 percent compensation for accumulated
CPI increases ofat least 12 percent during one month
or more, and 90 percent compensation if the CPI
increased by 25 percent in a single month.
The parties did not always abide strictly to the
formal COLA. Thus, in some periods of unanticipated
acceleration in inflation, the workers received addi-
tional ad hoc payments. On the other’ hand, the labor’
unions accepted a reduction in the rate of indexation
at the end of1984 and beginning of 1985 as a part ofan
anti-inflationary “package deal.” tn July 1985, COLA
payments wer’e suspended for’ three months in the
ear’ly stage of theY ~-tnti-infiationary pr’ogram. The
fon-mer COLA agreement was r-eintr-oduced thereafter’,
as the minimurn price increase necessary to trigger’
payments was even reduced to 4 percent. In May 1986,
however, the rate of indexation was reduced to 70
percent and the tr-igger’ ncreased again to 7 per-cent
As a r’esult of the different constraints to which it
has been subject, the COLAgenen-allv has not compen-
sated Israeli workers fully for’ past price incr’eases.
According to some calculations, rea/ wages would
have decr’eased by an aver’age of about 9 per-cent per
year’ between 1973 and 1982 if wages wer’e increased
only according to the COLA ar-n-angements (and in-
flation was unaffected).” Due to other- wage compo-
nents, n-calwages in effect r-ose by some 25 per-cent in
that period.
“This constraint (which formerly had been a3percent threshold)
turned out to be ineffective because inflation was higher than 5
percent. For otherproperties of the COLA agreementsee Klelman
(July 1984) and Liviatan (1982).
“Over the years, there have been heated discussions about the
purpose of wage indexation in Israel. Some have argued that it
should prevent real wage erosion; others have argued that it should
maintain the share of wages in national income.The decision of the
1975 committee was closer to the latter view; it could also be
interpreted as an attemptto compensate workers onlyfor monetary
disturbances and not for real disturbances. See Gray (1976) and
Kleiman (July 1984).
“See K(eiman (July 1984) and Liviatan (1982).
Wage indexation in Israel provides, however, a con-
venient interim working rule for the adjustment of
wages between contracts that ar-c negotiated annu-
ally on- hi-annually. In these negotiations, labor- and
management agree on a basic wage rate, winch then
will be automatically adjusted by the COLA during the
contract per’iod. The parties are aware that the COLA
does not fully compensate the workers for- past price
increases, and the wage negotiations ar-c affected by
the parties’estimate ofthe expected erosion ofthe n-cal
wage level during the contn’act period. The higher the
expected n-ate of inflation and the lower’ the rate of
indexation, the higher’is the increase in the base wage
nate agreed upon in the wage contract. Moreover-, the
higher’ the rate of real wage erosion due to the inade-
quacy of the COLA, the gn’eaten’ is the i-cal wage
increase derived from other components of the wage
contract.”
The par’tiaily indexed wage determination system in
tsrael has twoadditional effects. Finst, it creates a cycle
in real wages; they reach their’ mnaximum level when
the new contract is signed and fall thereafter-. There
are also smaller cycles between COLA adjustments. At
high rates ofinflation, this system pr’oduces consider’-
able fluctuations in n-ca) wages. Under’ such condi-
tions, worker’s can either adjust their real expenditun’e
patten-ns or stabilize their’ real expenditures oven’ time
hv adjusting their financial portfolios.
Second, because the par-ties to the wage contract
cannot anticipate exactly the rate of inflation, their
negotiations result in the determination of an ex-
pected aver’age i-calwage n-ate for’ the contractperiod. If
the rate of inflation deviates fiom its expected level,
the i-cal wage n-ate will he diffen-ent fromn its expected
level, pr-oducing disequilibrium in the labor’ mar-ke I.
Thus, it is ar’gued that in sortie cases the government
has dc)iber-ately adopted rtror’e inflationary policies
aimed at en-m-oding “excessive” n-cal wage incneases by
exploiting the imnper’fections of the COLA agr’eement.
tincer’tainty about frnture n-cal wage levels obviously
affects both the demand and the supply of labor. If
wonkers ar-c mon-crisk-averse than employers, this may
result in higher- average real wage levels and lower’
employment.
Even ifw’e abstract fromuthe last argument, it is clear’
that the alleged excessive real levelofwages in Israel is
not clue to excessive indexation, since r-calwages have
“For statistical tests bearing on these relations, see K(eiman (July
1984) and Liviatan (1982).Table 2
Average Tax Rates on Wage Income in
Israel, 1976~841
Effective income tax Effective netdirect taxes
as percentage offixed as percentageof fixed
realwage income at real wageincome at
average 1975 level average 1975 level2
increased secularly despite the real erosion due to
partial indexation. On the other- hand, indexation can
be considered as part of the inflationary mechanism
under conditions of accommodating mnonctary poli-
cies. However’, as argued above, high wage indexation
can also facilitate anti-inflation policies by preventing
realwage increases during the disinflation process.
Inflation affects taxation through two channels: ef-
fective taxrates and thetax base. Both are discussed in
this section.
Israel has traditionally taxed nominal income at
progressive r’ates — i.e., rates which increase with the
level of nominal income. Taxpayers with unchanged
real income drift into higher tax br’ackets as their
nominal incomes incr-ease; as a n’esu)t, they pay a
higher’ per-centage of their’ inconie in taxes (the n-cal
value of exemptions erode in a sinnilar fashion). Be-
cause the effective tax r’ates on different incomes do
not mci-ease proportionally dur’ing inflation,the after’-
tax distribution of income is affected as well.
Up to 1975, the adjustment of Israeli tax br’ackets
and exemptions to inflation was essentially ad hoc.
Since then, they have been formally indexed to the
CPI. Between 1975 and 1979, tax brackets and exemp-
tions were r’aised at six-month intervals by 70 percent
of the past per’iod’s inflation. In 1979—80, the dcgr-ee of
indexation was r’aised to 100 jicr’tant and the he—
quency of its application increased to every three
months. In 1984, this fr’equency was mci-eased to
match that of the COLA paid on wages. As shown in
table 2, however, incomplete indexation of tax brack-
ets and exemptions has resulted in an increased tax
burden for wage-earners who, unlike some other’ tax-
payers, cannot postpone their tax payments. Table 2
shows also that accelerations of inflation in 1979—80
and 1984 were accompanied by increases in the tax
burden (its fall in 1981 was due to an extra adjustment
of the br-ackets).
The effective rates oftaxation depend on more than
the actual rates alone; they are also affected by the lag
between the time when the tax liability is created and
when it is paid, and on the interest rate charged for
that period. The n-equired frequency of tax payments,
as well as the interest rates and fines charged on tax
arrears, were only gradually adjusted when inflation
accelerated. As a result, many taxpayers were able to
reduce the real value of their tax payments. According
to Bank oftsrael (B.O.I.) estimates, this effectproduced
a $480 million reduction in rea/ tax revenue as in-
flation accelerated from 190 per-cent in 1983 to 445
percent in 1984. This amounts to about 2 percent of
GNP, about equal to the government revenue from
money creation in recent years.
Business taxation in Israel has traditionally been
based on the difference between gross revenue and
nominal historical costs mncurr’ed in pn’oducing this
revenue. Under conditions of pr-ice stability, this base
is a reasonable approximation for the theonctical con-
cept of income as the potential increase in mietwealth
— that is, the amount that could be consumed with-
out affecting net wealth.”
When prices increase, the deduction of historical
nominal costs of production from taxable income
results in an increase in the rea/ tax base, even if the
real values of costs and sales are unchanged. For
example, assume that, dtiring a per-iodofstable prices










“Calculated fora married wage earner with two children
‘including income taxes, social security contributions and
children s allowances
SOURCE: SOt. Annual Report 1982 Table V-8, 1964 Table V-7
(Hebrew).
“See Hicks (1946), chap. 14.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OFST. LOUIS MAY 1986 ~
ning of the year and the product is sold forSOO Shekels
at the end ofthe year’. The firm’s taxable inconie is 150
Shekels or3Oper-cent ofits sales. Now, assume instead
that all pn’ices double dur-ing the year-, and the fin-ms
sales are 1,000 Shekels; its taxable income will thus he
650 Shekels or 65 per-cent of its sales even though its
costs and sales ar-c unchanged in real terms. Thus, if
income taxation is imposed on the nominal differ-ence
between revenues and costs, real net wealth wfll be
taxed at income tax rates that exceed the explicit tax
n’ates on wealth.
One impor-tant example of the effect of inflation on
the tax base is the taxation of interest income. When
inflation accelen’ates, nomninal r-ates of inten-est in-
cr-ease to compensate for the erosion of the pr’incipai
loaned. Taxing the inflation—induced por’tion of the
interest payments results in taxing the pn-incipal ofthe
loan. Symmetrically, born-owers who can deduct the
intlation—induced component of their’ intenest pay-
ments from their- taxable income receive a tax break.
The inflation-induced r’ise in the nominal rate of
interest men-eased the difter-ence between the befor’e—
tax and after-tax interest r’ates paid by borrowers who
could benefit from the full tax advantages.’ As a result,
there were strong incentives to r’edir’ect economic
activity and to restr’ucture portfolios to minimize in-
come fr’om highly taxable inten-est and to incr’ease tax-
deductible intcnest payments. In particular, private
businesses relied more heavily on debt financing;
interest payments were tax—deductible, while dim—
dend payments were not.
/~.n’ flu’ Fff:.:cls-
Over the year’s, the lsr’aeli gover-nment has intr-o-
duced several mneasuresto compensate, at least pan-
ally, for’ the effect of inflation on then-cal tax base used
Ion’ business taxation. First, an allowance for- acceler-
ated estimates of fixed capital investment deprecia-
tion costs for tax purposes shifted the timing of tax
payments to later’ per-iods when the real value of the
given nominal payments is lower. Second, allowances
for expenditures on inventony wer’e authonzed. i’hird,
lower tax rates were applied to some fonms of
“The difference betweenthese tworatesis equalto (t)x (i),where t is
the tax rate and i is the nominal rate of interest. According to the
8.0.!. calculations, the difference between realbefore- and after-tax
short-term interest rates increased from 4.5 percent in 1983 to 12
percent in 1984. SeeSOt. Annual Report 1984, table Vlll-l0.
‘‘inflation—induced nominal r’evenues’’ — n-evenues
that n-elect only the adjustment of nominal values to
the change in prices and then-efocc are not n-cal gains.
Thus, inflation—induced capital gains were taxed at a
relatively low flat i-ate of 10 per-cent. Similarly, mt lex—
ation payments on gover-nment—issued, indexed finan-
cial assets were exempt from taxes, and the holder-s of
these assets were requin-ed to pa~’taxes unIv on the
real in terest receipts. Fourth, the gover-nment has
partially imposed income taxation on the inflation—
induced income gained from ldnv interest loans
gr-anted by business to their owners and employees.
These tax adjustments were not applied universally
and wer’e only partially n-elated to the effect of inflation
on thetax base. Thus, they did not completely neutral-
ize the aclvemse effects of the tax system under in-
flationany conditions.
In 1982, lsrael adopted the “Taxation under In-
flationary Conditions Act” to ensure that business
taxation would he applied only to the incr’ease in the
real net worth of the taxpayer’. To achieve this restrlt,
the new law provided that:
a I the Iil-rn be gn-antedacapinal pr-eservation all )wa I r
deducnion on the differ-ence between the value of its
assets which are subject to nominal tarxaniomr and its
liabilities, ifthis diffen’ence is positivc.
hi if the tim-rn’s liabilities ar-c larger than the assets
subject to numinal taxation a pr-opor’nional pam-i of its
interest payments will not be tax—deductible.
The idea behind the ne~vlaw, in pr-ir~ciple,was
simple and elegant. Many of its pnovisions were com-
plicated, however, and it considerably incn-eased ef-
forts devoted to tax management. Because of the
ambiguity ofsome ofits pr’ovisions, manyfirms discov-
er’ed that they were able to control the level oftheir tax
returns. Instead of increasing tax collection, as the
government had intended, the new act n’esulted in
“While some tax payments are deferred, the Israeli firm is, in
principle, subject to full taxation of the nominal appreciation of
certain assets (like inventories)and to taxation of the real (inflation-
adjusted) appreciation of otherassets (like physical capital). On the
credit side of its balance sheet, it can deduct fully the interest (and
indexation) paymentson its liabilities, but cannotdeduct expenses
against its equity capital.
Underthis system, there is no positive or negativetaxation of the
firm’s real net worth if the (reevaluated) value of theassets that are
subject to full nominal taxation is equal to its liabilities. However, if
the value of the subject to full nominal taxation assets exceeds (is
less than) the value of the liabilities, the present system results in
partial positive (negative) taxation of the firm’s real net worth. The
intention ofthe tworecommendations wasto preventthis positive or
negative real net worthtaxation.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF St. LOUIS MAY 1966
lower real taxreceipts. Thus, the B.O.l. estimated in its
1984 anmunal r-epor’t that the new law reduced i-cal tax
revenue by the equivalent of $350 million (about 1.5
pen’cent of GNP) between 1983 and 1984.
In 1985, a committee appointed by the gover’nment
recommended the abandonment of the taxation un-
der the Conditions ofInflationAct and theadoption of
a new system. According to these r’ecommendations,
corporate taxpayers (and some other businesses) will
be n’equired to submit reports based on accounting
carriedin ternns of U.S. dollar’s or constant pun-chasing
power’ Shekels iadjmisted dail I. Other taxpayers will
he requir’ed to adjust their units ofaccount monthly—
on’even more often ifinflation remains in the two-digit
monthly n’ange.
Ear-ly reactions to these r-ecommendations pointed
to consider-ably increased costs of tax management
(with special difficulties for firms that carry their
accounting on an accr-ual rather than a cash hasisi
The adoption of these r’econnmnendations could have
affected considerably the rest of the economy and, in
particular-, impinged on the monetary regime. Thus,
constant—purchasing—power Shekel accounting would
have encouraged firi-the’ CP t indexation throughout
the economy, while Do!lar- accouriling would have
resulted in a full ‘‘Dollarization’’ of the Israeli econ—
omv. As mentioned ear-lien-, the Israeli economy had
anyway been subject to ‘‘crawling I )ollar’izatior m’’ for’ a
number- of years.” Inview of the sizable r’ecm’,nt reduc—
ion in the inflation rate, it seems t tat these new
recommendations will not be ~l)plieil.
Adjustment ofprivate portfolios of assetsand liabili-
ties to inflation has been strongly affected by tax
consider-ations, by the natur’e ofthe gover-nmcnt inter-—
vention in financial mar-kets and the inconnplete ad-
justment of the government’s financial activities to
inflation.
The Israeli goven’nnnent intervenes heavil,v in finan—
“Between 1983 and 1985, there were heated discussions about the
merits of adopting official Dollarization as a shortcut for rapid
disinflation.
cial markets in attempting to affect the allocation of
resources in the economy. By closely controlling the
process of long-tenn financial intermediation, the
government functions, in eft’ect, as a huge finamicial
intermediary. It m’aises funds directly and indir’ectlv
from the private sector; it uses pat-I of these pr’oceeds
to finance its own deficit and directs the rest as loans
to private bor’rower’s under’ closely controlled condi-
tions. The public sector’ pays relatively high rates of
n’etur-n to savers and allocates funds to favor-ed activi-
ties such as btrsincss fixed investment, exports and
housing at lower rates of interest. The differ-ence
between the gover’nment borrowing and lending rates
represents a subsidy that is Iinanced through the
gover’nment budget.
Since the 1950s, mnost gover’nment bonds and long-
ten-mu financial savimigs, which are largely backed by
gover’nment bonds, have been indexed (pr’imam-ily to
the CPU.’ Short-term deposits indexed to the rate of
exchange of diffen’ent for’eign cur’r’encies are supplied
to the private sector by the BUt. Gover’nment loan
mndexation was also intr’oduced in the l950s, but it was
discontinued in the laGOs amid reintr-oduced only
gm-adually dur’ing the 1970s ihecomimig again the gen-
eral rule by 1981).” In addition, the nominal rates of
interest chan’ged on mion—indexed gover’nment loamis
wem’e only belatedly and partially adjusted to inflation
during the 1970s — as can be seer) from table 3.”
As could he expected, firms and! individuals made
consider-able effon-t to qualifi’ for’public loans offered at
increasingly negative neal rates of inter’est during the
1970s. The ter’ms of these loans had important, some-
times very inefficient, effects on the direction of ecu—
nontic activity and the distr’ihution of income, and
wealth, hinden-ing the development of private capital
mar-kets and contmihinting It) the incr’ease in goven-n—
men t deficits. Tbus, the 1984 13,0.!. annual report
estimated that the value of subsidies and tn-ansfet-s
granted by the authom-ities to cr’edit horr’owem’s aver—
“Partially indexed government bondswereissued between 1975 and
1982. The partial indexation, however, was applied in a way that
ensured positive real ratesot return at any rateof inflation.
“In 1962, a 87 percentdevaluation produced a large real increase in
thevalue of the (then widespread) foreign exchange indexedloans.
The government renegotiated theterms of the loans in favor of the
borrowers. Thereafter, it introduced devaluation and indexation
insurance options whose premiums were relatively low. Thus,
indexation of government loans practically disappeared for many
years.
“By the end ofthe period, the low nominal rates of interest shown in
table 3 appliedonly to asmall (and highly subsidized) proportion of
public loans.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MAY 1988 (~
Table3
Inflation and Nominal Rates of Interest in Israel, 1970—82
Interest
rateon Interest on Interest on
Average short-term subsidized subsidized
yearly “free” long-term tong-term
rate of commercial loans to loans on
Period inflation
1 bankcredit’ manufacturing’ mortgages3
1970—72 10% 16% 9% 7%
1973—74 29 22 9 8
1975—76 35 29 12 10
1977—78 42 46 19 12
1979—80 103 162 30 12
1981—82 119 155 30 NA.
‘Increase in average yearly Consumer Price Index (see Table 1 for Decemberto Decemberrates of
inflation).
‘Intereston approved overdraft facilities.
‘Overthe years, indexation wasincreasinglyapplied to subsidized loans, and, by the end of theperiod,
these low nominal rates appliedonly to a small partofpublic loans.
SOURCE: MeirSokoler (1985).
aged 4 percent of GNP in 1974—78, 9 percent in 1979—
80, and 5 per’cent in 1981—84. It is difficult, however’, to
determine how much govem-nment spending on subsi-
dies to borr’owers reflected discr’etionary policy and
how much was the r’esult of unanticipated inflation.”
As increased inflation raised the cost of holding
money, people began to economize on their’ money
holdings in predictable ways. ‘they changed their
payment patterns by matching mom-c closely their
receipts and paymneots; they increasingly resorted to
the use of over-draft facilities and relied more on
interest—beanng assets, rather than money, as tempo—
r’amy abodes of pur’chasing power’. ‘t’r’ansaction costs
incur’r’ed in shifting among differ’ent assets became
relatively unimpor-tant when compared with the in—
creasing differences between rates of retur-n of money
arid other- assets. Table 4 shows bow the real yalire of
money balances has decreased dur’urg the ~‘ear’s of
high inflation despite positive CNP growth.
“See Cukierman (1985), Litvin and Meridor (1983) and Sokoler
(1985). Litvin and Meridor estimated that unplanned inflationary
transfers from the government to borrowers averaged about 4
percent of disposable income in 1975—80.
As inflation accelerated, the Israeli public shifted
mainly fr-omn money to indexed assets r’ather than to
non—inidexed, mt em-es t—beam’ing assets like time die—
posits and certificates of deposil lCDsl . ‘t’he 1nrblic’s
pr-eferetice for- indexed momiey substitutes was due, to
a lam-ge extent, to the availabilit of two types of
relatively liquid indexed assets — tr’adm,ahle CPt-
indexed government bonds and short-ter’m deposits
indexed to the rate ofexchamige.These assets served as
hedges against unexpected inflation. In addition,
short—n’un fluctuations in their’ n-cal values wer’e kept
for many year’s withimr a relatively nar’r’ow r’ange by
official intenvermtion.”
‘fable 4 shows that the valtte of money and unin-
dexed short—ten’mn deposits men-eased considerably in
1985.This was due to the steep r’eduction in the rate of
inflation in the second pant of the year’ and to policy-
induced incr’eases in the r-eal r’etur-n on innindexed
deposits.
“See Shifter (1982) for a discussion of this policy. The preference for
government-backed indexed assets was also affected by different
tax treatment of the indexation differentials on these assets and the
nominal interest on unindexed deposits. Correction of this tax
discrimination in the early 1980s increased the demand for unin-
dexed assets; their share in the public’s portfolios, however, re-
mained reratively low until recently,etc. The holding of such assets is legally limited in
Table4
Money and Money SubstItutes in Israelt,




Period supply’ substitutes’ substitutes’
1970 302 243 418
1972 391 300 489
1974 309 137 794
1976 280 81 649
1978 268 64 875
1980 140 51 914
1982 113 136 1000
1984 75 127 1188
1985 94 315 958
Components of the Israelr ‘M,” monetary aggregate December
data.
‘— currency and non interest-bearrng checking accounts
finindexed trme deposits certificates of deposmts and the
- short term loan” (an unindexed 8 0 I bill)
Foreign exchange indexed deposits of Israeli resrdents in
domestic banks (excluding deposits created by personal
restitutron payments from the F R of Germany) and marketable
indexed government bonds
SOURCE: B0 I annual reports and other 80 1 data
Under conditions of high and var’iable inflation
people are especially n’etuctant to hold illiquid assets
that do not offer a reasonable hedge against unex-
pectedinflation. Such assets are now practically non-
existent in Israel. On the other hand, the Israeli public
has acquin’ed considerable amounts of tinily indexed
long-term financial assets, such as closed saving de-
posits and different kinds of pension and insurance
funds that ar-c backed primarily by gover-nment debt.
Thus, despite high and rising inflation, the govern-
ment has been able to finance part of its deficit
through domestic debt sales. Domestic debt financing
aver-agedsome 5 percent ofGNP in the 1974—84 period
— about the same as in the 1988—73 period.’°
Besides indexed domestic financial assets, direct
claims against foreigners and physical assets can also
serve as hedges against inflation. Claims against for-
eigners can he held in the form of cash, international
traveler’s checks, deposits abm-oad, fomeign secun-ities.
“See Bruno and Fischer (1984) and 8.0.1. annual reports, table Vllr-2
(1983 and 1984),
Isr’ael, but ther’e ar’e strong indications that the legal
constraints are not always stm’ictly obsen’yed. In paflic-
ulan-, for’eign exchange is often used illegally as a
means of payments arnomig Israeli m’esidents, or be-
tween Israeli residents and fom’eign visitor’s. This use
apparently has risen in recent year’s along with the
increased indexation to foreignexchange in the Israeli
economy. Between 1933 and the first half of 1985, the
demand for foreign exchange increased as many Is-
raelis became concerned about the possible taxation
of domestic financial assets. The demand for foreign
exchange increased also as it became evident that,
with a 400 percent annual inflation m-ate, monthly
indexation ofmany financial assets to the CPI may not
provide adequate protection against inflationary er-o-
sic) n. Accom-ding to so nie ear-h’ indications, the adop-
tion of the 1985 stabilization plan has br’ought about
the reduction in the asset demand for- foreign ex-
change.
The availability of indexed financial assets (and
for’eign claims) has reduced the demand for- physical
assets, like hoimsing, as hedges against intlation.
Since 1973, the demand for’ these assets also was
adversely affected by reduced real GNP and popula-
tion gr-owth. On the other hand, physical investment
has been encouraged by the availability of cheap
gover-nment loans. Table 5 shows that the average
incn’easein the n-cal value ofphysical assets held by the
public has tagged behind that of financial assets (ex-
cluding unrecorded claims against foreignen-si be-
tween 1973 and 1984.
in Ihe late 1970s atid eam-ly 1980s, tsm-ael expem’ienrced
an unprecedented boom in its stock market. This
experience was, at least, partially related to the effects
of inflation. Due to the inflationary taxation of their
nominal profits, banking concerns suffered losses in
their real equity value. In addition, they were unable to
raise adequate funds through unindexed assets and
were not allowed to compete with the government in
the indexed bond market. They resorted, therefor-e, to
manipulation of the market prices of their shares in
order to increase the attn-activeness of new share
issues. This activity had destabilizing effects on the
stock market, amid the banks were finally fonced to
discontinue their manipulation in October 1983. At
that time, the real value of bank shares fell sharply.
The lsr’aeli public and its government have re-
sponded in a variety of ways to the long inflationaryFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SI. LOUIS MAY 1988 ~
Table5
Increase in Financial and Physical










1970—73 13.2% 16.7% 26.8%
1973—78 9.7 6.8 6.6
1978—84 6.3 3.8 5.7
1970—84 9.0 7.5 10.2
SOURCE: Dan Yariv(1984); 8.0.1. calculations.
experience to which the country has been subject
and, in par-ticuku-, to the acceleration of inflation over’
the past decade. Isn-ael has adopted a variety of social
contrivances intended to n-educe, at least partially,
some of the effects of unanticipated inflation. The
most important of these contrivances have been the
diffem-entindexation devices described in this article.
The adjustment of the tsr’aeli economy to rising
inflation has been long, arduous and incomplete. As
partial measures wer’e applied, new problems cnn-
erged; often, pam’tial adjustments created new inef’-
Iiciencies. Genier-ally speaking, the 1970—85 pem-iod of
high and rising inflation in lsr’ael has been cham-acter—
ized by very intensive financial activity, by frequent
shifts of financial demands between mar’kets and by
n-apid financial innovation. I”irms, and individuals to a
lesser extent, restructured their’ assets and liabilities
to benefit fr-om the impemfect adjustment in the public
sector’s financial operations and the tax system. All
toli, considerable r’esounces wem’e jrrvestecl in finamrcial
and tax management r-ather than mon pr’orltrctive
activities. For example, the share of finance and busi-
ness services employment rose from 5.2 per-cent in
1970 to 9.5 percent in 1984.”
Because of its elabom’ate inflation—adjustment mccli—
anisms, tsrael has been able to avoid majon’ economic
br’eakdowns despite its unfavom’ahle inflation expem-i—
ence. The economiiic pem’formance of lsm’ael has, how—
“Kleiman (January 1984)and Marom (1986) estimated that some2—
4 percent of 1982 GNP was directed to financial inflation-ad)ustment
activities.
ever,clearly deteriorated inthe 1970s and ear-ly 1980s.”
While othen’ factor’s also have contributed to this
result, there can be no doubt that high and rising
inflation and imperfections in inflation adjustment
have adversely affected economic efficiency and con-
tributed to the detenior’ation of the country’s eco-
nomic performance.”
As a r’esult, there has been gr’owing recognition in
Israel that price stability is a more attractive policy
alternative than attempting to find ways to adjust to
high inflation. “‘I’lies, by mid—1985, Israel began an
amhitiotrs anti—inflationary program that has pro-
duced many encour-aging initial r’esults.
As inflation went down, people have hegitti to
change gradually the habits arid institutions that
wete adopted during the high inflation years. These
changes have so far been limited by the people’s
concern about the possibility of reinfiation. There is a
strong feeling that inflation-adjustment mechanisms
should he curbed further in the future to support a
sustainable lower rate of inflation. Some of the
changes that have been adopted under the pressureof
inflation, however-, nnay also prove beneficial in amore
stable environment. Thus, for- example, some som’t of
financial indexation may contribute to the smooth
and efficient oper-ation of long-term financial nian’-
kets.”
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